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Abstract Currently, companies spend a great deal of effort on Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) disclosures. CSR disclosure relates to the provision of
information on companies’ environmental and social performance. From an eco-
nomic perspective, companies might disclose this information to avoid or decrease
potential political costs. We construct a CSR disclosure index based on the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. Using content analysis, we analyze 130 listed
German companies’ CSR disclosures (470 firm-year observations) to investigate the
determinants of these voluntary disclosure activities. Our results show that, con-
sistent with the political cost theory, German companies’ disclosures of all CSR
issues are affected by their visibility, shareholder structure, and relationship with
their US stakeholders. In addition, higher profitability is associated with more
environmental disclosures. Finally, size and industry membership affect the amount
of CSR disclosure.
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1 Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) refers to a company’s voluntary contribution
to sustainable development which goes beyond legal requirements. During the last
years, we have seen an increase in CSR (media) campaigns and in corresponding
disclosure activities. Today, large companies specifically spend a great deal of effort
and money on disclosing information on their social and environmental
performance.
From an economic perspective, companies should only undertake actions that
reduce costs or enhance benefits; that is, only disclosures that reduce costs or
increase revenues are desirable. We argue that due to firm-specific characteristics,
companies have to deal with either more or less powerful stakeholders and thus face
different levels of political and societal costs. By voluntarily disclosing information
on their social and environmental performance, companies try to reduce these costs.
Consequently, we argue that CSR disclosure is determined by a number of such
firm-specific determinants acting as proxies for political and societal costs. In this
paper, we try to identify the determinants that induce companies to disclose CSR
information.1
To test our hypotheses, we construct a CSR disclosure index based on the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. The GRI provides a framework of the societal
and environmental issues that should be disclosed in corporate reports. We use a
hand-collected set of specific CSR data (extracted from the reports by means of
content analysis), as well as 130 listed German companies’ underlying firm-specific
characteristics (470 firm-year observations). Our results are mostly consistent with
our hypotheses: a company’s visibility, its shareholder structure, and its relationship
with US stakeholders affect CSR disclosure. In addition, profitability affects
environmental disclosure, a specific category within the CSR disclosures.
Our study contributes to a greater understanding of the variation in companies’
CSR disclosures. First, we provide evidence of CSR disclosures in Germany, which
is an interesting setting as companies are not required to disclose CSR information.
Therefore, the provision of CSR information is voluntary and not bound by
regulation. Other European countries (e.g., the UK, France, and the Netherlands)
have more specific guidelines or requirement for the provision of CSR information
(Kolk et al. 2001). These differences in regulatory environments may have affected
the results of previous studies focusing on a European level (e.g., Kolk 2005; Kolk
et al. 2001; Maignan and Ralston 2002; Meek et al. 1995).
Furthermore, while former studies have often focused on either annual reports
(Cormier and Gordon 2001) or on specific CSR reports (Tate et al. 2010), we focus
on the various reports that companies could use to disclose CSR information. This
includes the annual report (which is mandatory), but also voluntary CSR reports, as
well as other specific reports (e.g., environmental, social, and human capital
reports). Additionally, prior studies have often not considered all aspects of CSR,
but have focused on either environmental or social disclosures (Bewley and Li
1 Note that we only focus on disclosures, not on a company’s overall CSR performance. Companies’
social and/or environmental performances may be bad, but they make abundant CSR disclosures.
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2000; Deegan and Gordon 1996; De´jean and Martinez 2009; Lynch 2009). Those
studies that take both perspectives into consideration (e.g., Guthrie and Farneti
2008) have mostly applied one-dimensional measures (e.g., the number of pages
with CSR information in relation to the total number of report pages). Such
measures don’t account for the different CSR facets. In our study, we consider both
CSR disclosure dimensions by dividing the provided information into an
environmental and a social perspective, as well as an overall measure for CSR
disclosure. Finally, we extend the set of CSR disclosure determinants by including
factors like the shareholder structure, the company’s visibility, its industry
membership, and its relationship with its US stakeholders.
The article is structured as follows: in the next section, we will review the
relevant theory and derive the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 contains the study
design and the methodology. Section 4 presents our results together with a
discussion and interpretation of these. The study concludes with a summary, a
description of its limitations, and an outlook on further research.
2 Theory and hypotheses development
2.1 Theoretical perspectives on CSR disclosure
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be defined as a company’s voluntary
contribution to sustainable development which goes beyond legal requirements
(Bowen 1953; Carroll 1999, 2006; Crane and Matten 2007; De Bakker et al. 2005).
Under the current2 ‘‘profit-maximizing CSR perspective,’’ firms have to consider the
social and environmental costs and benefits to maximize their value (Bowen 1953;
Callens and Tyteca 1999; Drucker 1984; Gladwin et al. 1995; McWilliams and
Siegel 2001). That is, companies are assumed to be socially responsible because
they anticipate benefiting from these actions. Examples of such benefits might
include the ability to charge a premium price for its output or the use of CSR to
recruit and retain high quality workers. These benefits are presumed to offset the
higher costs associated with CSR, since resources must be allocated to allow the
firm to achieve a higher CSR status (Siegel and Vitaliano 2007).
The growing CSR awareness is also reflected in the increasing number of CSR
and sustainability reports, as well as in the provision of CSR-related information
(e.g., through advertising; Gray et al. 2001; Kolk 2005). CSR disclosure can be
defined as the information that a company discloses about its environmental impact
2 Historically, economists have developed two contrary approaches to CSR. On the one hand, there is
neo-classical economics’ traditional perspective: a company’s main objective is to maximize the
shareholder value. Hence, companies should only undertake actions which either increase profits or
decrease costs, while adhering to all legal principles and protecting its integrity (Friedman 1962, 2007;
Husted and Salzar 2006; Rappaport 1998). The neo-classical economics’ traditional perspective has
mostly disparaged CSR (Aupperle et al. 1985; Friedman 2007). On the other hand, the stakeholder
approach constitutes the theoretical basis of most arguments supporting CSR. It argues that companies
should try to fulfill all stakeholders’ demands, which—at least in the long term—results in higher
economic profits (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Freeman 1984; Frooman 1999).
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and its relationship with its stakeholders by means of relevant communication
channels (Campbell 2004; Gray et al. 2001).
Many different theoretical attempts have been made to explain why companies
voluntarily disclose CSR information (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Gray et al. 1995a;
Guthrie and Parker 1989; Patten 1991). We rely on political cost theory to develop
our hypotheses. The political cost theory suggests that managers are concerned with
political considerations, including preventing explicit or implicit taxes, or other
regulatory actions (Healy and Palepu 2001; Jensen and Meckling 1978; Watts and
Zimmermann 1978). In addition to politicians, non-governmental interest groups
and other stakeholders increasingly try to influence companies’ actions to favor their
specific interests. They thus have the power to affect wealth transfers between the
company and other stakeholders. Our assumption is that by disclosing information
on their social and environmental performance, firms want to minimize the
(potential) costs arising from the interaction between the firm and its natural and
societal environment—referred to as political or societal costs (Fields et al. 2001).
Companies can employ a number of methods to reduce the likelihood of adverse
political or societal actions and the resulting costs (Watts and Zimmermann 1978).
One of them is to disclose CSR information, as this allows the firm to generate
moral capital that, for example, can temper punitive sanctions in the case of a
negative event (Blacconiere and Patten 1994; Godfrey 2005). Empirical evidence
seems to confirm this notion. For instance, Lyon and Maxwell (2006, 2007) find that
firms with poor reputations disclose fully, while firms with excellent reputations
disclose nothing, as they gain little by disclosing successes since they are expected
to succeed.
We argue that—due to their specific characteristics—companies face different
intensities of external pressures as a function of their stakeholders’ particular levels
of power, legitimacy, and urgency (Agle et al. 1999; Mitchell et al. 1997).
Consequently, companies deal with different political costs and benefits. Therefore,
we argue that the answer to the question why firms disclose CSR information is
quite simple: because it is in their (economic) interest. A company is hypothesized
to engage in CSR if it anticipates that the benefits will be greater than the costs
(Siegel and Vitaliano 2007), and any decision to voluntary disclose information on
CSR issues results from these trade-offs between the expected costs and benefits
(Dye 1985; Verrecchia 1983).
Different firm-specific characteristics act as a proxy for the degree of stakeholder
pressure that companies face. We argue that these firm characteristics determine
whether CSR disclosure occurs or not.3 Other attempts to explain voluntary CSR
disclosures have also suggested that firm characteristics are important determinants of
disclosure activities (Cormier and Gordon 2001; Meek et al. 1995). Empirical studies
have used a wide range of measures that, for example, include industry membership,
the number of shareholders, and press coverage (Milne 2002). We utilize a broader
range of factors which, in previous (theoretical) literature, has been identified as
3 Firm size, for instance, has often been mentioned as a central indicator of the amount of political or
societal costs but was found to act as a proxy for more than just political costs (Ball and Foster 1982;
Milne 2002).
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potential determinants of voluntary disclosure decisions: company visibility,
profitability, the shareholder structure, and the company’s relationship with its US
stakeholders. In addition, we control for the effects of industry membership and firm
size. On the basis of these determinants, we develop four hypotheses, which will form
the foundation of our further analysis in the following sections.
2.2 Hypotheses development
2.2.1 Company visibility
Some companies are more visible to the public than others. Their degree of visibility
depends, amongst others, on the quantity of their (business) press coverage.
Companies constantly in the media spotlight are especially susceptible to political
actions, since they attract more attention from stakeholders than less visible
companies (Deegan and Carroll 1993; Powell 1991). These stakeholders (including
pressure groups) are interested in these companies’ activities and try to influence
them. Consequently, visible companies are more affected by social constraints and
pressures than companies which are less visible to the public (Belkaoui and Karpik
1989; Brammer and Millington 2006; Holthausen and Leftwich 1983). That is, they
are potentially subject to higher political or societal costs as a result of their exposed
position in the public. Thus, highly visible companies are assumed to disclose more
CSR-related information to reduce potential political costs than less visible
companies (Belkaoui and Karpik 1989). Based on previous reasoning, we assert that
H1 CSR disclosure is positively associated with company visibility.
2.2.2 Profitability
Profitable firms could face higher social constraints and public exposure than less
profitable firms (Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Watts and Zimmermann 1978,
1990). They are more affected by potential political costs, especially if they appear
‘‘overly’’ profitable (Fields et al. 2001; Han and Wang 1998). As a result, profitable
companies may have to explain that they operate within the (explicit or implicit)
norms of society, as they will find it costly to be associated with actions that breach
society’s expectations (Islam and Deegan 2010). Therefore, profitable companies
could be more interested in explaining—via CSR disclosure—how they ‘‘produce’’
their profitability than less profitable companies (Bewley and Li 2000). In addition,
profits provide managers with resources from which the costs of disclosures are
funded (Brammer and Pavelin 2006).4 On the basis of the previous arguments, we
propose that
H2 CSR disclosure is positively associated with profitability.
4 Alternatively, profitability could also indicate that the company might not care about social and
environmental aspects. In other words, the company’s profitability is achieved through the exploitation of
its workforce or the environment. This could lead to profitable companies disclosing less information on
their ‘‘CSR performance’’ than less profitable companies. However, it is unlikely that this argument is
viable in the long run.
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2.2.3 Shareholder structure
The potential for conflicts between owners (principals) and managers (agents) is
greater in companies where shares are widely distributed rather than in more closely
held companies. The reason is twofold: when ownership is dispersed, shareholders
have little direct authority over managers and must therefore monitor their activities
(Brammer and Pavelin 2006); in addition, communication between relevant parties
is hindered (Fama and Jensen 1983). Consequently, voluntary disclosures are likely
to be greater in widely held firms, allowing the principals to effectively monitor that
their economic interests are optimized, while agents can signal that they act in the
owners’ best interests (Chau and Gray 2002; Fama and Jensen 1983). Moreover,
companies with few big shareholders (e.g., family-owned firms) have little
motivation to disclose information, especially in excess of mandatory requirements,
because the demand for public disclosure is relatively weak (Chau and Gray 2002).
Furthermore, large shareholders normally obtain information in other ways than
through company reports. They often have direct access to the management board,
which results in lower information asymmetry between them and the managers
(Chen et al. 2008). On the other hand, disclosure activities are usually directed at a
large, dispersed group of relatively small shareholders. Finally, public accountabil-
ity may become more important, because there is a greater trend towards widely
dispersed companies held by the public at large (Ghazali 2007). A higher level of
public accountability may necessitate additional involvement in social or commu-
nity activities and, hence, disclosure of these activities. This suggests that
companies with a big group of small shareholders are likely to provide more
CSR-related information in their reports to reduce the potential political costs.
Based on the previous review, we posit that:
H3 CSR disclosure is positively associated with more dispersed share ownership
structures.
2.2.4 Relationship with US stakeholders
Societies have developed different political, financial, and cultural systems
reflecting their institutions, ethics, and social relations (Whitley 1999). That is,
stakeholder identities and interests vary cross-nationally. Accordingly, political
costs are likely to vary across nations, given that they reflect cultural and social
norms (Meek et al. 1995). Matten and Moon (2008) argue that in liberal market
economies, for example in the US, disclosure of CSR activities is more common
than in Scandinavian and Continental European countries. For instance, in the US
there is greater scope for corporate discretion, since government is less powerful
than in most European countries and European governments have generally been
more engaged in economic and social activities (Lijphart 1984, Matten and Moon
2008). Consequently, the US system leaves more incentives and opportunities for
companies to assume comparatively explicit responsibility.
Against this background, Matten and Moon (2008) mention explicit CSR in the
US and implicit CSR in Europe. Explicit CSR refers to corporate policies that
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convey responsibility for certain societal interests; this responsibility normally
consists of companies’ voluntary programs and strategies that combine social and
business value, and address issues perceived as part of the company’s social
responsibility. Implicit CSR, on the other hand, refers to companies’ role within the
wider formal and informal institutions to address society’s interests and concerns.
Implicit CSR normally consists of values, norms, and rules that result in companies
being (mandatorily and customarily) required to address stakeholder issues and that
define corporate actors’ appropriate obligations in collective rather than individual
terms. Matten and Moon (2008) argue that US corporations tend to provide more
CSR information, as this provides them with the opportunity to distinguish
themselves from their competitors. Such an explicit CSR disclosure is the result of a
corporation’s deliberate, voluntary, and often strategic decision. On the other hand,
Continental European firms operate in an environment in which CSR is not seen as a
voluntary and deliberate corporate decision but as a reaction to, or a reflection of, a
corporation’s institutional environment (Matten and Moon 2008).
Differences in the CSR environment are likely to affect voluntary CSR
disclosures, since, at the very least, cultural aspects influence the issues which
companies select as worthy of disclosure (Kolk et al. 2001; Langlois and
Schlegelmilch 1990; Matten and Moon 2008). Specifically, we argue that organi-
zational practices (in our case, voluntary CSR disclosures) change when companies
start operating and financing (part of) their organization in a different institutional
environment (Matten and Moon 2008). Empirical evidence supports this notion; for
example, Bancel and Mittoo (2001) find that European companies disclose more
information when they are cross-listed on a US stock exchange, suggesting that
disclosure levels change when companies move into different institutional environ-
ments. Since CSR disclosures tend to be more pervasive in the US,5 we hypothesize
that companies provide more CSR information when they deal with US stakeholders:
H4 CSR disclosure is positively associated with a company’s relationship with its
US stakeholders.
2.3 Control variables
Stakeholder pressures, as well as the resulting political costs are influenced by the
industry to which a company belongs (Brammer and Millington 2006; Verrecchia
1983). For instance, companies with a high environmental impact receive more
attention from environmental lobby groups; these groups try to influence politicians
and the general public to impose costs on those firms with poor environmental
performance. Consequently, these firms have more incentives to disclose CSR
information in general and environmental information in particular to reduce the
5 Note that there are also considerable differences with regard to the required disclosures across
European countries. For example, in the Netherlands, more than 200 firms with a significant
environmental impact are required to publish environmental reports. This legal obligation strongly
influences disclosure levels, since the relevant companies disclose much more CSR information than their
counterparts (Kolk et al. 2001). However, firms in our sample are not required to disclose information;
therefore, we expect that those with a US listing will tend to provide more CSR information to comply
with customary US disclosure patterns.
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impending costs (Deegan and Gordon 1996). For instance, chemical companies are
likely to be more sensitive about disclosures to the public than companies in most
other industries (Meek et al. 1995). Previous literature confirms that industry
membership is associated with corporate disclosures (Cowen et al. 1987; Deegan
and Gordon 1996; Holder-Webb et al. 2008; Meek et al. 1995; Patten 1991).
Consequently, we use industry membership as a control variable.
Firm size is our second control variable. Large firms tend to be more visible to
the public and tend to be subject to greater political and regulatory pressures from
external interest groups (Meek et al. 1995; Roberts 1992; Watts and Zimmermann
1978, 1986, 1990). To reduce these (potential) political costs, large firms disclose
more information to demonstrate that their actions are legitimate and consistent with
good corporate citizenship (Brammer and Pavelin 2006). Furthermore, larger
organizations are more likely to use formal channels of communication (e.g., annual
reports or other corporate documentation) to disseminate CSR information
(Brammer and Pavelin 2006). Previous empirical studies confirm the association
between firm size and the level of CSR disclosures (e.g., Cowen et al. 1987; Meek
et al. 1995; Patten 1991; Cho et al. 2009; Cormier and Gordon 2001; Deegan and
Gordon 1996; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Gray et al. 1995a; Holder-Webb et al.
2008; Roberts 1992). Finally, we use year dummies to control for time effects.
3 Design of the study and methodology
3.1 Sample construction
Our analysis focuses on Germany for two reasons: comparability (i.e., exclusion of
institutional differences between countries) and the voluntary disclosure environ-
ment. As pointed out earlier, CSR and, thus, CSR disclosure differ between
countries (Matten and Moon 2008; Van der Laan-Smith et al. 2005). To generate a
homogenous dataset, we decided to concentrate on corporations with an identical
political and societal background—thus on companies from the same country. We
chose Germany as it has no official regulation on how to report on social and
environmental aspects. Therefore, CSR disclosure is completely voluntary.
We focus on the German DAX, MDAX, and SDAX. These three indexes include
the 130 biggest listed German companies. Our sample focuses on the index
composition as at the end of 2008. We consider four reporting periods6 between
2005 and 2008; this results in 520 firm-year observations. We only consider reports
provided in English (all companies in the sample provide their reports in English as
well as in German). Since some companies’ reports are not available for all the
years (for instance, if a company entered one of the indices after 2006), our sample
was reduced by 35 observations. Furthermore, we lost 15 observations due to other
6 The SDAX’s composition changes very frequently, as companies continuously enter or leave the index.
Considering more than four reporting periods in our analysis would therefore have disproportionately
shortened the number of observations in the sample.
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missing information, for example, on the shareholder structure. Our final dataset
consists of a total of 470 firm-year observations.
3.2 Content analysis
In this analysis, we are interested in the CSR information (message) transmitted by
corporate reports (communication channel) and provided by the sample companies
(source) to their stakeholders (receiver; see Shannon and Weaver 1998). Similar to
previous studies, we use content analysis to quantify the amount of CSR information
in the reports. We apply a so-called ‘‘third party approach’’ in which content
analysis is carried out by someone who is neither a provider (source) nor a receiver
of the report.
Content analysis is a method of codifying written text into various groups or
categories on the basis of selected criteria. It assumes that frequency is an indication
of the subject matter’s importance (Abdolmohammadi 2005; Guthrie et al. 2004;
Krippendorff 2004). Its objective lies in generating a numerically based summary of
a chosen message set (Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002). Previous literature
suggests that content analysis provides valid results for corporate social and
environmental reporting research, thus allowing the researcher to evaluate the extent
of various items’ disclosure (Deegan and Gordon 1996; De´jean and Martinez 2009;
Gray et al. 1995b; Guthrie et al. 2004; Guthrie and Farneti 2008; Guthrie and Parker
1989).
3.2.1 Unit of analysis
A key issue in content analysis is the unit of analysis. A unit is an identifiable
component of a communication through which variables are measured (Holsti 1969;
Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002). Depending on the unit of analysis, there are
several ways of applying content analysis, for instance, by counting words,
sentences or sections, or by reading the whole text (Neuendorf 2002). Another
possibility is to use advanced software packages to extract information from reports
(e.g., Chen and Bouvain 2009, Tate et al. 2010). We decided to use words as the unit
of analysis because the coder is not required to provide subjective judgment.
Furthermore, searching for specific terms in the text is regarded as the most reliable
form of content analysis: it always yields the same results in repeated trials, as it can
be easily replicated (Abdolmohammadi 2005). We used the PDF reader’s word
count function after manually checking its validity.
3.2.2 Identification of keywords
In line with previous research (Guthrie et al. 2008; Guthrie and Farneti 2008;
Holder-Webb et al. 2008), we derived the keywords for our content analysis from
the framework of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Although it is not free from
criticism, the GRI is regarded as the most relevant institution in the context of CSR
disclosure (Moneva et al. 2006) and is often referred to as the global standard.
Owing to the voluntary nature of the guidelines, organizations have the flexibility to
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decide what information to disclose. The GRI guidelines cover all aspects of CSR,
as they consider an economic, environmental, and a social perspective. Since
companies are obliged to disclose financial and, thus, economic information, we
only incorporate the environmental and social perspectives in our coding
framework.
The GRI guidelines provide indicators of all three CSR perspectives. These
indicators can be split into core indicators and additional ones. Core indicators are
of interest to most stakeholders, and are therefore relevant for most companies,
while additional indicators are only of interest to some stakeholders and companies
(GRI 2010). We derived the keywords for our analysis from the core indicators by
defining one or more keywords for every indicator, thus considering the singular and
plural forms (‘‘equal opportunity’’/‘‘equal opportunities’’), as well as British and
American English (‘‘labour’’/‘‘labor’’). By having derived the keywords from a
well-grounded framework like the GRI guidelines, we improve the results’ validity,
as the guidelines can be assumed to reflect CSR’s ‘‘real meaning.’’ As shown in
Table 1, we finally obtain a total number of 32 keywords.
3.2.3 Communication channel
We focus on reports provided proactively on the companies’ website. In general,
there are different ways of disclosing information on CSR. First, companies may
integrate CSR-related aspects into their annual/financial reports by enhancing these
reports. Second, companies may provide special/separate CSR or sustainability
reports (in addition to their annual reports). Companies may also provide
information on CSR-related issues through various corporate reports, for example,
through separate financial, environmental, social, and human capital reports.
Finally, companies may use other media, for example, press releases, to disclose
CSR-related information. In our analysis, we concentrate on the first three
possibilities, thus taking the most important communication channels for CSR
disclosure into account.
3.3 Dependent variables: CSR disclosure
Our first variable of interest is whether companies provide a separate CSR report
(denoted CSRR), as it can be assumed that companies disclose more CSR
information if they provide special CSR reports. CSRR is a dummy variable that
indicates whether or not a separate CSR report is provided in the corresponding year
(‘1’ indicates a separate report, ‘0’ otherwise). We derived the other three variables
from the reports provided by the sample companies. We compiled three variables
extracted from the provided reports7 by using content analysis based on the defined
keywords:
CSRTOT ¼ CSRENV þ CSRSOC
7 In total, we analyzed 592 documents with a total of 88,469 report pages.
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CSRTOT is the total quantity of CSR disclosure, CSRENV is the amount of
environmental disclosure, and CSRSOC the amount of social disclosure (i.e., the
total number of keywords found in the analyzed reports). The three variables are
identified for each of the companies by a summary of all the relevant reports’ results
in a specific year. For example: if a company provides an annual as well as a CSR
report in a year, we summarize the content analysis results for both reports to
achieve the total disclosure indexes for each company. Thus, the indexes reflect the
number of hits when searching for all keywords in each category.
3.4 Independent variables: determinants of CSR disclosure and control variables
Company visibility (VISIBILITY) is closely related to the media attention a
company receives. We measure visibility by counting the number of hits when
searching for the companies’ names8 on the Handelsblatt newspaper’s website
Table 1 Keywords for the
content analysis derived from
the GRI framework
Keywords
Environmental Social
Recycled Employment
Energy consumption Employee turnover
Biodiversity Collective bargaining
Emissions Collective agreements
Effluents Occupational health
Waste Occupational safety
Spills Training
Environmental impacts Diversity
Equal opportunities
Human rights
Discrimination
Freedom of association
Child labor
Forced labor
Compulsory labor
Community
Corruption
Public policy
Compliance
Fines
Sanctions
Product responsibility
Customer health
Customer safety
8 We use the companies’ names as provided on the Deutsche Boerse AG website (2010).
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(Handelsblatt 2009). The Handelsblatt is the most important German newspapers in
terms of business press with the highest impact due to its national coverage and its
importance for investment communities.9
Profitability is measured by the ratio ‘‘return on invested capital’’ (ROIC)
provided by Thomson One Banker.10 We use the freefloat in percentage of common
shares (FREEFLOAT) as a measure for the companies’ dispersion regarding its
share ownership structure. This information was taken from the website of Deutsche
Boerse (2010). We use the listing at a US stock exchange as an indicator of the
companies’ relationship with their US stakeholders11; a ‘1’ indicates that the
corresponding company is listed at a US stock exchange and ‘0’ that it is not
(USLISTED). We obtained this information from the companies’ websites or by
directly contacting the relevant company.
We used the classification provided by Deutsche Boerse (2010) to classify the
sample companies into 18 industries (see Table 6 in the Appendix); dummy
variables are used to distinguish between industries. We employ two measures for
the companies’ size, as we expect them to affect the disclosure activities in the
different CSR categories: the number of employees (EMPLOYEES) and the amount
of total assets (TOTASSETS). The number of employees in each year and company
is available on the Deutsche Boerse AG website (Deutsche Boerse 2010); we
assume that this measure is likely to be associated with social disclosures. The
amount of total assets is available from Thomson One Banker (Thomson One
Banker 2009); as total assets may be a proxy for environmental impact, it is likely
that this measure is associated with environmental disclosures.12 Table 2 offers a
summary of the data sources, the dependent and independent variables, and
abbreviations.
3.5 Regression analysis
We use a Probit estimation for models that have CSRR as a dependent variable. This
provides a consistent estimation of the probability that the binary dependent variable
will have a value of one (i.e., that the firm provides a CSR report) contingent upon
the independent variables. We use ordinary least squares regressions for models that
have CSR disclosure levels as dependent variables (CSRTOT, CSRENV and
CSRSOC). We estimate our models as described below:
9 To validate the VISIBILITY measure, we repeated the previously described analysis in respect of the
Financial Times Deutschland and the Wall Street Journal. The correlation analysis indicates that the three
visibility measures are closely correlated, adding to our measure’s validity.
10 According to Thomson One Banker, ROIC is calculated as follows: ROIC = (Net Income before
Preferred Dividends ? Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized)/((Last Year’s Total Capital ?
Last Year’s Short Term Debt and Current Portion of Long Term Debt) ? (Current Year’s Total
Capital ? Current Year’s Short Term Debt and Current Portion of Long Term Debt)/2) * 100.
11 Alternatively, we could have used sales in the US as a proxy. We decided to use US stock listing as the
literature (e.g., Bancel and Mittoo 2001) suggests that foreign listings are key for increasing visibility,
prestige and image in other markets, for growth of the shareholder base/appeal to foreign investors, and
for implementing a global strategy. Thus, we consider the US listing as a proxy for US stakeholders’
involvement.
12 Companies with high total assets are generally from the manufacturing and energy supplying industry.
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CSRR ¼ fðVISIBILITY; ROIC; FREEFLOAT; USLISTING; IND; SIZE; YRÞ
respectively
CSRDISC ¼ fðVISIBILITY; ROIC; FREEFLOAT; USLISTING; IND; SIZE; YRÞ
where, CSRR, CSR report variable (‘1’ if the company produces a CSR report, ‘0’
otherwise); CSRDISC, CSR Disclosure index extracted by means of content
analysis (for respectively CSRTOT, total amount of disclosure; CSRENV, total
amount of environmental disclosures; and CSRSOC, total amount of social
disclosures); VISIBILITY, Number of hits found for the companies’ names at
www.handelsblatt.com; ROIC, Profitability measured by return on invested capital;
FREEFLOAT, Shareholder structure by percentage of common shares in the free-
float; USLISTING, Relationship with US stakeholders measured by means of the
US listing (yes or no); IND, Industry dummies for 18 industries, respectively
(‘BANKS’ is the benchmark); SIZE, Size, measured by the number of employees or
by the amount of total assets, respectively; YR, Year dummies for 2007–2009,
respectively (2006 is the benchmark).
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 3 indicates that the dispersion of most variables is on an acceptable level. To
reduce skewness and kurtosis, we take the log of the variables EMPLOYEES and
TOTASSETS (labeled ‘logEMPL’ and ‘logTA’).
The results of our content analysis show that the amount of CSR disclosure is
increasing over time (see Fig. 1). The number of CSR reports that the companies in our
sample provide (CSRR) increased from 14 in 2006 to 26 in 2009. The total disclosure
index (CSRTOT) increased from 10,050 hits in 2006 to more than 21,650 hits in
2009.13 This development is displayed in Fig. 1, which also divides the total disclosure
index into social and environmental disclosures. Our findings are consistent with most
other studies on CSR disclosure (e.g., Gray et al. 2001; Kolk 2005; Matten and Moon
2008). They suggest that (German) companies are increasingly becoming aware of
CSR disclosures’ positive effects on their political costs.
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations for the disclosure indexes, the
independent variables, and the control variables. The correlations between the
independent variables provide no indication of multicollinearity, as no bivariate
correlation exceeds the value of 0.9 (Cheng et al. 2007; Farrar and Glauber 1967;
Hair et al. 2010; Peng and Beamish 2008; Roberts 1992).14
13 Over the same period, the average number of pages in the analyzed reports increased from 160 in 2006
to 204 in 2009 (per company-year observation).
14 However, in order to ensure that there is no multicollinearity, we performed an additional test by
calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all the variables where the bivariate correlations exceed
the value of 0.5. The results indicate that all VIF factors are well below the tolerance values of 10,
indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue in our analyses (Hair et al. 2010; Roberts 1992).
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With the exception of the profitability measure, the correlation matrix reveals a
positive interrelation between all the disclosure indices and the independent
variables, which is consistent with our hypotheses. Firm size is also associated with
all the disclosure indices. Furthermore, the Pearson correlations reveal strong
industry effects, as companies from ‘‘polluting industries’’ (e.g., CHEMI, UTILI,
and AUTOM) disclose a great deal of CSR information.
4.2 Regression analysis
While the descriptives and correlation analysis provide some insights into the
average level and the univariate relations between the variables, we are interested in
their joint effects. We applied regression analysis to estimate these effects, using the
disclosure indices as the dependent variables. Table 5 presents our main results.
The results in Table 5 are mostly in line with our hypotheses. Consistent with H1
is that the companies’ visibility is positively associated with CSR disclosure
(p \ 0.10 for all dependent variables). Our second hypothesis is only partially
confirmed: profitability is associated with more environmental disclosures
(p \ 0.10), but this doesn’t affect the total or social disclosures (p [ 0.10). H3 is
confirmed by our results: the shareholder structure determines CSR disclosures.
Thus, the higher the percentage of freefloat, the more a company discloses
information on its social and environmental performance. Finally, a company’s
relationship with US stakeholders (H4) affects all the disclosure indices (p \ 0.10):
companies apparently adjust their disclosure practices when they operate in
distinctively different business environments.
Consistent with some earlier work (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin 2006; Roberts
1992), our models provide evidence of a significant systematic variation across
industries regarding their propensity to make CSR disclosures. In particular, we find
that companies from so-called ‘‘polluting sectors’’ provide more information on
environmental issues (such as the automobile, basic resources, chemical, construc-
tion, transportation/logistics industries; all p \ 0.10). These companies have a long
0
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Fig. 1 Descriptive results of the content analysis
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tradition of (and experience with) CSR campaigns, as they have been confronted
with powerful stakeholders from the environmental movement since the early
1980s. Accordingly, they proactively disclose much information on their environ-
mental performance to reduce the possible political costs arising from their despised
activities (Deegan and Gordon 1996; Meek et al. 1995).
Companies from the consumer industry and the energy supplying industries
disclose more information on all CSR aspects. As consumer industry companies
normally have an exposed public position (most of them sell their goods to end
consumers), they have strong incentives to reduce their political costs through CSR
disclosures. Companies from energy supplying industries may face all kinds of
external pressure groups as a result of the nuclear power debate in Germany; this
may have pressured them to disclose more CSR information.
Companies in the service sector (such as insurance, software, and the technology
industry) generally tend to disclose less CSR information (p \ 0.10). While this is
understandable given their lower environmental impact, it is rather surprising that
companies in these industries also provide less information on social issues, if one
considers that their employees are likely to be a key asset. One reason for this
apparent lack of disclosure may be that the keywords we used relate to issues that
are more salient in production industries (e.g., occupational health and safety,
product responsibility).
The results also show that a company’s size (specifically, the number of
employees) affects CSR disclosures (p \ 0.10). In addition, the amount of total
assets (logTA) affects environmental disclosure. This finding may be due to industry
effects, since, in general, companies with high total assets belong to polluting
industries.
Our findings are mostly consistent with certain earlier works on environmental
disclosures in other countries (e.g., Chen and Bouvain 2009; Brammer and Pavelin
2006) and on executive pay disclosures in Germany (e.g., Chizema 2008). In
addition, our results are also largely consistent with our hypotheses derived from
political cost theory, which suggests that companies disclose information to reduce
potential regulation and taxation (Watts and Zimmermann 1978). However, our
findings also suggest that environmental and social disclosures are driven by
somewhat different stakeholder groups as reflected in different firm characteristics.
For example, firms in ‘‘polluting sectors’’ tend to have relatively high levels of
environmental disclosure, but similar levels of social disclosure. This may reflect
pressures from different stakeholder groups: firms in ‘‘polluting sectors’’ may be
monitored by environmental groups, while firms in consumer sectors may be more
closely monitored by consumer groups. Similarly, firm profitability is associated
with higher environmental disclosures but not with social disclosures. This may be
due to historical developments: companies in ‘‘polluting industries’’ have been
confronted with powerful stakeholders for a long time, while Western consumers
only seem to have been concerned with labor practices since the latter part of the
1990s (Islam and Deegan 2010). Longitudinal studies may provide more insight into
these issues.
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5 Summary and conclusions
Economists have for long tried to determine the reasons for companies voluntarily
disclosing information on environmental and social aspects. We rely on the political
cost theory (Watts and Zimmermann 1978) to argue that companies report on CSR
for economic reasons: they try to reduce their political costs by providing
information on their social responsibility (Fields et al. 2001). Even though some
researchers argue that the political cost hypothesis does not fully and satisfactorily
explain the reasons for voluntary (CSR) disclosure (Milne 2002), we believe that its
assumption provides at least some explanation for companies voluntarily disclosing
CSR information.
We identify a number of firm-specific factors which are likely to act as proxies
for political costs and, as such, are likely to be related to a company’s willingness to
voluntarily disclose CSR information. On the basis of the GRI framework’s core
indicators, we apply content analysis to detect the amount and content of CSR
information provided by the 130 largest listed companies in Germany.
Our results show that CSR disclosure is positively associated with higher
company visibility, a more dispersed shareholder ownership structure, and US
cross-listing (a proxy for US stakeholders’ interest in the company). Profitability
only affects CSR disclosure’s environmental dimension. Furthermore, our results
show that CSR disclosure is affected by industry membership and firm size:
companies from ‘‘polluting industries’’ tend to have a higher level of environmental
disclosures. Finally, big companies disclose more than small companies.
These results are mostly consistent with the political cost theory, from which we
derive our hypotheses. That is, firms appear to disclose CSR information to reduce
the potential impact of additional regulation, taxes, and other activities that may
negatively affect the firm’s value. Failure to remove informational asymmetries
(i.e., lower disclosure) may result in more occupational safety regulations, higher
anti-pollution taxes, and consumer boycotts that may reduce the firm’s value.
Our results also suggest that there are some differences in the disclosure
dimensions: environmental disclosures appear to be driven by somewhat different
firm characteristics than social disclosures. A potential reason is that these factors
relate to different stakeholder groups; for example, environmental stakeholder
groups may emphasize environmental disclosure while consumer groups may
emphasize labor practices. Over time, societal expectations regarding what is
considered ‘‘appropriate behavior’’ may evolve; consequently, CSR disclosures may
also evolve over time as different stakeholder groups gain or lose power. One
avenue that further research could explore is different stakeholder groups’ rise and
fall, and the disclosure practices of companies responding to these dynamics in their
stakeholder environment.
As with all empirical studies, this study is subject to limitations. First of all, the
industry classification is open to criticism, as some industries are represented by
only three or fewer companies. Second, since only one country is researched, the
cultural aspects can’t be generalized. Third, content analysis also has its limitations:
using keywords as units of analysis may be an inappropriate methodology, as these
words are detached from their textual background. While we account for unusual
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scores in some reports, our results may have been affected by our methodology.
Finally, deriving the keywords for the content analysis from the GRI guidelines is
not free of risk, as the guidelines might not capture all of the relevant CSR aspects
(Moneva et al. 2006).
Despite these limitations, we believe that our results provide interesting insights
into the determinants of CSR disclosure. In addition to the limitations mentioned
previously, there are other opportunities in the field of CSR disclosure. For example,
a broader set of variables that can act as proxies for other stakeholder groups could
be considered as possible determinants of CSR disclosure. On the other hand, the
receivers of information have to be integrated into the research in order to analyze
the linkage between neo-classical theory and CSR disclosure. That is, the effects of
the disclosed information on the companies’ stakeholders, in general, and their
shareholders, in particular, need to be examined.
6 Appendix
See Table 6.
Table 6 Number of companies
per industry sector (according to
Deutsche Boerse 2010)
Industry-sector Abbreviation Number of
companies
Automobile manufacturers AUTOM 7
Banks BANKS 4
Basic resources BASIC 3
Chemicals CHEMI 12
Construction CONSTR 5
Consumer CONSU 8
Financial services FINAN 19
Food and beverage FOODB 1
Industrial INDUS 32
Insurance INSUR 3
Media MEDIA 6
Pharma PHARM 8
Retail RETAI 8
Software SOFTW 1
Technology TECHN 1
Telecommunication TELEC 1
Transportation and logistics TRANS 8
Utilities UTILI 3
Total 130
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